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«THE BURNING QUESTION OF PHYSICOCHEMICAL SCIENCE».
PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS ABOUT THOMAS HUXLEY’S
READING OF CARTESIAN PHYSICS
di
Salvatore Vasta
J’espère que nos neveux me sauront gré, non seulement des
choses que j’ai ici expliquées, mais aussi de celles que j’ai
omises volontairement, afin de leur laisser le plaisir de les in-
venter.
René Descartes
There are some men who are counted great because they rep-
resent the actuality of their own age, and mirror it as it is. [… ]
But there are others who attain greatness because they embody
the potentiality of their own day, and magically reflect the fu-
ture. They express the thoughts which will be everybody’s two
or three centuries after them. Such a one was Descartes.
Thomas H. Huxley
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to investigate the path that led Descartes’ philosophy
to have a special place in the works of Thomas H. Huxley (1825-1895). Actual-
ly, in an age where British idealism believes that materialism and mechanism are
harmful to philosophy and to science, Huxley, instead, shows the need to recon-
cile these two approaches with biological sciences, stressing that they cope only
with methodological, and not teleological, issues. To do this it is necessary to
come back to the father of modern philosophy and to better investigate his posi-
tion about the life sciences.
By means of a philological investigation, Huxley proves that Descartes’
works on physics and automata provide important suggestions for the philosophy
and science of the 19th century. According to Huxley, the most important paths
that Descartes pointed out were the foundations of rational cosmogony and phys-
iological psychology. In Huxley’s opinion, the fact that all reality (physical and
organic) is subordinate to identical scientific laws proves that Descartes was right.
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I suppose that thanks to the influence of Descartes, Huxley’s intellectual op-
eration strives to undermine Comtean positivism and to preserve the British New
Philosophy. To this end I think that Huxley considers the presence of Cartesian
rationalism in the 19th century as necessary to strengthen the methodological as-
sertions of science.
2. The Cartesian Physiology
Huxley’s opinion on Descartes moves from a clear assumption: he was not
only a great mathematician or philosopher, but also a ‘great and original physi-
ologist’, insofar as he did for the «physiology of motion and sensation» what
Harvey did for blood circulation, «opening up that road to the mechanical theory
of these processes, which has been followed by all his successors»1.
Through Huxley’s works, it is not difficult to understand that Huxley studied
Descartes for a long time and that the French philosopher was always in his
mind, especially regarding the question of the relationship between «brute mat-
ter» and «organic matter», and generally about the mind-body topic2. This
«physiologist of the first rank» – as Huxley addresses Descartes, – two centuries
after his death, seemed to him to be not so much physically alive but present
matters. His latent but active presence can be testified in conjunction with
philosophers of the 18th century like David Hartley (1705-1757) or Albrecht von
Haller (1708-1777), who influenced Huxley on issues concerning the sensitive
nature of man3.
In Huxley’s works, the quotations about Descartes are numerous, and the
English Naturalist dedicates to him at least two important essays4. In his other
works, the French philosopher is quoted at length, for instance in the monograph
on Hume5 or in the first ever-written article on ‘Evolution’ – in the Encyclopedia
Britannica6 – in which «Darwin was nonplussed to find himself the culmination
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1 T.H. Huxley, On the Hypothesis that Animals are automata, and its History (1874) (hence-
forth in brackets: date of first publication), in Id., Collected Essays (Voll. IX) (henceforth CE),
I, London, Macmillan & Co., 1893-94, p. 201; Id., The Progress of Science (1887), in CE, I,
pp. 48-49.
2 Id., Hume (1878), in CE, VI, passim. In particular: pp. 59 sgg., 72-120.
3 A first theoretical framework about Descartes and physiology is by A. Georges-Berthier, Le
Mecanisme Cartesien et la physiologie au XVIIe siècle, in «Isis», 2 (1914), pp. 37-89.
4 See T.H. Huxley, On Descartes’ Discourse Touching the Method of Using One’s Reason
Rightly and of Seeking Scientific Truth (1870), in CE, I, pp. 166-198; Id., On the Hypothesis that
Animals are automata, and its History (1874) cit., passim.
5 See Id., Hume (1878), in CE, VI.
6 See Id., ‘Evolution’ lemma, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 18759.
of Cartesian Philosophy and biological discovery»7 – or in the address The
Progress of Science, where Descartes is indicated as proponent of «a schema of
evolution, as a hypothesis of what might have been the mode of origin of the
world, while professing to accept the ecclesiastical scheme of creation, as an ac-
count of that which actually was its manner of coming into existence»8.
Huxley wrote the lemma “Evolution” for the Encyclopaedia Britannica
(1875, 9th edition) in the Section “Science-Biology”. The third part regards “The
Evolution of the Sum of Living Beings” in which he espoused the ideas of fore-
runners about evolution. By expounding a summary of different theories, Huxley
considers Descartes’ philosophy of the greatest importance. Hereafter, the entire
passage of the third part is quoted:
«The notion that all the kinds of animals and plants may have come into ex-
istence by the growth and modification of primordial germs is as old as specula-
tive thought; but the modern scientific form of the doctrine can be traced histor-
ically to the influence of several converging lines of philosophical speculation
and of physical observation, none of which go farther back than the 17th century.
These are:
1. The enunciation by Descartes of the conception that the physical universe,
whether living or not living, is a mechanism, and that, as such, it is explicable on
physical principles.
2. The observation of the gradations of structure, from extreme simplicity to
very great complexity, presented by living things, and of the relation of these
graduated forms to one another.
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7 A. Desmond, Huxley. From Devil’s disciple to Evolution’s high Priest, Reading MA,
Perseus Books, 1994, p. 486.
8 See T.H. Huxley, The Progress of Science (1887) cit., p. 98. Nevertheless, it is important to
evaluate the entire paragraph, in order to consider the place of Descartes in the history of Evolu-
tion: «The growth of a plant from its seed, of an animal from its egg, the apparent origin of innu-
merable living things from mud, or from the putrefying remains of former organisms, had fur-
nished the earlier scientific thinkers with abundant analogies suggestive of the conception of a cor-
responding method of cosmic evolution from a formless “chaos” to an ordered world which might
either continue for ever or undergo dissolution into its elements before starting on a new course of
evolution. It is therefore no wonder that, from the days of the Ionian school onwards, the view that
the universe was the result of such a process should have maintained itself as a leading dogma of
philosophy. The emanistic theories which played so great a part in Neoplatonic philosophy and in
Gnostic theology are forms of evolution. In the seventeenth century, Descartes propounded a
scheme of evolution, as an hypothesis of what might have been the mode of origin of the world,
while professing to accept the ecclesiastical scheme of creation, as an account of that which actu-
ally was its manner of coming into existence. In the eighteenth century, Kant put forth a remark-
able speculation as to the origin of the solar system, closely similar to that subsequently adopted
by Laplace and destined to become famous under the title of the “nebular hypothesis”» (ivi,
pp. 97-98).
3. The observation of the existence of an analogy between the series of gra-
dations presented by the species which compose any great group of animals or
plants, and the series of embryonic conditions of the highest members of that
group.
4. The observation that large groups of species of widely different habits
present the same fundamental plan of structure; and that parts of the same animal
or plant, the functions of which are very different, likewise exhibit modifications
of a common plan.
5. The observation of the existence of structures, in a rudimentary and appar-
ently useless condition, in one species of a group, which are fully developed and
have definite functions in other species of the same group.
6. The observation of the effects of varying conditions in modifying living
organisms.
7. The observation of the facts of geographical distribution.
8. The observation of the facts of the geological succession of the forms of
life»9.
In other terms, for Huxley, Descartes has described the same issues of the
physiology of the 19th century, using old conceptual (physical) categories.
If the general idea about an evolution of life has always been in philosophical
systems, only since Descartes can it be conceivable by means of well-grounded
scientific principles. If in an immediate future, the Cartesian viewpoint would
represent the turning point for physics in the 17th century, for the biology of the
19th century, it was its latent substratum.
His intuitions were more profound than they seemed to be to his contempo-
raries and all that is necessary to do for the physiology of the 19th century is to
«make them coincide with […] present physiology in form», in a way that they
are able «to represent the details of the working of the animal machinery in mod-
ern language, and by the aid of modern conceptions»10.
Huxley admits that the reappraisal of Descartes is done not only by himself,
but also by other philosophers, for instance Herbert Spencer. In this respect,
Huxley points out: «The profound and vigorous writings of Mr. Spencer embody
the spirit of Descartes in the knowledge of our own day, and may be regarded as
the ‘Principes de la Philosophie’ of the 19th century»11.
I would argue that Huxley performed this conceptual transfer through two
different scientific strategies.
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19 See Id., ‘Evolution’ lemma, in Encyclopaedia Britannica cit.
10 Id., On Descartes’ Discourse Touching the Method of Using One’s Reason Rightly and of
Seeking Scientific Truth (1870) cit., p. 185.
11 Id., ‘Evolution’ lemma, in Encyclopaedia Britannica cit.
i) The first program consists in strengthening the epistemological issues of
the physiology through the assumptions of Cartesian physics; that is, by applying
the ideas of ‘force’ and of ‘movement’ as basic elements of living-matter.
ii) The second program consists in building a weak (or soft) reductionism in-
to the fields of the life sciences, by using an antithetic view to that of positivism,
which in general stresses the idea of a prevalence of physics on biology.
iii) Finally, a third point links these two issues into a cohesive cultural per-
spective, whose goals are both social and educational. Huxley states that «[…] It
is because the body is a machine that education is possible. Education is the for-
mation of habits, a superinducing of an artificial organisation upon the natural or-
ganisation of the body; so that acts, which at first required a conscious effort,
eventually became unconscious and mechanical. If the act which primarily re-
quires a distinct consciousness and volition of its details, always needed the same
effort, education would be an impossibility»12.
According to this outlook one could affirm that, apart from the influence of
cultural ideas (volitions, ideas, external stimuli etc), an appropriate study of the
body is possible thanks only to a pure and simple naturalistic vision, without any
external influence of a metaphysical sort.
Thus, in Huxley’s opinion, Descartes represents the type of scientist who is
able to catch the drift of separation of the two spheres – mental and physical, sci-
entific and humanistic – since he has reserved for them an equal but separate in-
quiry in which the mental structure can justify even the logical existence of con-
sciousness, but never explain that physical laws depends on its structure.
Hence, culture is artificial in the sense that it – in the case of humans – may
model a natural structure to help it acquire patterns of behaviour that, as they are
habits, could become subconscious, that is ‘mechanical’. This kind of mecha-
nism, however, is deeply different from that which Nature shows within itself.
Mechanism is a natural property of nature; on the contrary, habits are artificial
properties originating from external stimuli (e.g. culture), and they appear to an
observer to be mechanical qualities only in their performance and not in their
natural constitution.
3. A new model for Science and Philosophy
For Huxley, Descartes, more than any other philosopher, has laid the foun-
dations of the rational cosmogony and physiological psychology’ of the 19th
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century13. But the importance of the analysis of Descartes’ works made by Hux-
ley aims to stress not only its scientific purposes strictu sensu; it also tries to un-
derline in a special way the ideal break that Descartes has established in the his-
tory of the methodology of science and of philosophy. Because of this, «the
essence of modern, as contrasted with ancient, physiological science appears to
me to lie in its antagonism to animistic hypotheses and animistic phraseology. It
offers physical explanations of vital phenomena, or frankly confesses that it has
none to offer. And, so far as I know, the first person who gave expression to this
modern view of physiology, who was bold enough to enunciate the proposition
the vital phenomena, like all the other phenomena of the physical world, are, in
ultimate analysis, resolvable into matter and motion, was René Descartes»14.
In this respect, in the same essay Huxley points out that we ‘owe’ to
Descartes «both the spiritualistic and the materialistic philosophies’ of the XIX
century»15. This separation does not mean the origin of a simple dualism, but is
the evidence that – through the parting of the two phenomena (material and men-
tal) – Descartes was really up to «seek for the explanation of the phenomena of
the material world within itself»16, by pointing out that «our certain knowledge
does not extend beyond our states of consciousness»17.
Huxley’s aim is to stress that Descartes was a materialist, not because of an
ideology, but because he strongly believed in physical issues as being the basis
of the structure of the world, and in an «active scepticism» as a means to achieve
scientific truth18.
The explanation of Huxley about these statements is remarkable. The
metaphor that he uses is the same adopted by Descartes: «All the actions which
are common to us and the lower animals depend only on the conformation of our
organs, and the course which the animal spirit take in the brain, the nerves, and
the muscles; in the same way as the movement of a watch is produced by noth-
ing but the force of its springs and the figure of its wheels and other parts»19.
In other words, force and «its subsequent movement» are the only possible
explanations for a body, just as for a clock. For all this, the body of a living man
and the body of a dead man differ from each other in the same way as a watch or
other «automaton (that is to say, a machine which moves of itself) differs in it-
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13 Id., The Progress of Science (1887) cit., p. 49.
14 Id., The Connection of Biological Science with Medicine (1881), in CE, III, p. 358.
15 Ivi, p. 359.
16 Ibidem.
17 Id., Science and Morals, in CE, IX, p. 130.
18 Id., On Descartes’ Discourse Touching the Method of Using One’s Reason Rightly and of
Seeking Scientific Truth (1870) cit., p. 170.
19 Id., The Connection of Biological Science with Medicine (1881) cit., p. 360.
self when it works or when it is broken»20. Both the body and the watch show the
tenets of their working, even in the case of non-functioning! In fact, the absentia
of both movement and force reveal that life and death are nothing but biological
and physiological states in which the principle that support them has stopped.
I wish to remark that Huxley does not think to establish a simple symmetry
between the structure of matter and the pattern of life-matter. His philosophical
project is to demonstrate how important Descartes was in announcing the reso-
lution of the dilemma concerning the differences between the realm of the organ-
ic and that of the non-organic. Because of this he sees Descartes as a forerunner
of scientific reductionism, but without breaking the vision of nature as a whole.
In Huxley’s mind, the boundaries of Descartes’ thought lie only in the limit-
ed scientific knowledge of his time. From this point of view, Giovanni Alfonso
Borelli’s treatise De Motu Animalium, or the physiology and the pathology of
Herman Boerhaave, are nothing but developments of Descartes’ fundamental
conception of the English scientists21. On the contrary, Huxley pays a tribute to
results reached from Descartes as regards the medical experiments he carried out
in the last part of his life: «[…] With the origin of modern chemistry, and of
electrical science, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, aids in the analysis
of the phenomena of life, of which Descartes could not have dreamed, were of-
fered to the physiologist. And the greater part of the gigantic progress which has
been made in the present century is a justification of the prevision of Descartes.
For it consists, essentially, in a more and more complete resolution of the grosser
organs of the living body into physico-chemical mechanisms»22.
This quotation represents Huxley’s clearest statement about both Descartes’
philosophy and his science. Thus, the reading of Descartes’ physics is to be re-
garded as special. In Huxley’s vision it would be about a physics ‘subjected’ to
physiology, since the Cartesian physics, as scientific matter, does not distinguish-
es itself much from the empirical observations made by Aristotle23.
Keeping a distance from spiritual ideas to explain living beings, Huxley finds
the best results from Cartesian physics. From this viewpoint, he analyses it not
so much in its detail but for its innovative scientific framework. To put his argu-
ment more forcefully, Huxley turns to the well-known Cartesian example of the
clock: «I shall try to explain our whole bodily machinery in such a way, that it
will be no more necessary for us to suppose that the soul produces such move-
ments as are not voluntary, than it is to think that there is in a clock a soul which
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causes it to show the hours’ [De la Formation du Fœtus.]. These words of
Descartes might be appropriately taken as a motto by the author of any modern
treatise on physiology»24.
The attempt to explain the link between ‘actions’, as the consequence of will,
and ‘movements’, as the final result of the coordination of different parts of the
body, proves much more important for Huxley than finding a valid reason to ex-
plain what ‘will’ or ‘thought’ are in themselves. The methodological connection
that Descartes suggests in Huxley’s arguments (or that he believes to read in
Descartes’ arguments) is to avoid having recourse to external causes, as one does
when one thinks about the mechanism of a clock.
For Huxley, the mechanism stated by Descartes is the key to solve a puzzle:
Why can organic matter not be regarded as consisting of the same elements and
principles that make up the non-organic? Huxley thinks that only a «robust faith»
in the universal applicability of the principles laid down by Descartes will help
to show that the ‘actions’ that science defines as ‘vital’ are nothing but «changes
of places of particles of matter»25.
Huxley thinks that this rapprochement is made possible thanks to his new
(flawed) theory about protoplasm. In any case, his attempt to put forward a proj-
ect to find a new place for physics and biology among the sciences is evident.
Therefore, there is no reason to accept Marie François Xavier Bichat’s extreme
vitalism or the softer view from Christian Wolff. The path cleared by Descartes
is the only one that science can take, after solving the problem of brute matter26.
Huxley defines this issue as «the burning question of physicochemical sci-
ence», whose project he thinks could be parallel to that for finding the better sci-
entific strategies to have an understanding of the evolution of life, starting from
chemical basis and not only looking at a comparative or morphological ap-
proach27.
In Huxley’s works it is possible to find a clear example of this design, with
useful and practical outcomes, in his essay entitled The Connection of Biological
Science with Medicine28. Actually, Huxley presumes that by moving the argu-
mentation from the traditional themes of medicine, concerning only the phase of
treatment, to that of the inquiry, that involves the relationship between physiol-
ogy and biology, it will be possible to cure diseases better29.
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25 Ibidem.
26 Ibidem.
27 Id., The Connection of Biological Science with Medicine (1881) cit., p. 221.
28 Ibidem, passim.
29 Ivi, p. 227.
4. The reaction to Positivism and Descartes’ materialism
In conclusion, from Huxley’s point of view, the progress of science depends
on the epistemological framework in which the particular sciences are placed;
and from this viewpoint, Huxley’s project is the opposite to that stated by August
Comte’s positivism.
To this regard, after having been falsely accused of talking about his phi-
losophy without having read his works, Huxley’s position against Comte is il-
lustrative30. The opinion about Comte had been really negative. Having de-
fined Comte’s philosophy as «Catholicism minus Christianity»31, Huxley had
attacked the heart of positivism head-on, by accusing it to be a sort of dog-
matism. And he opposed it through a vision of science, clinging to what he
defined as a ‘materialism’ on the level of scientific explanations, but remain-
ing closed to a materialistic philosophy on the ground of scientific ideology.
In this respect, Huxley explained his viewpoint in 1868: «I, individually, am
no materialist, but, on the contrary, believe materialism to involve grave philo-
sophical error»32.
Thus, we can conclude our argument by stating that Huxley entrusts the fu-
ture of science with the task of reflecting about the two following issues, which
for him are literally axioms:
i) the demand to remain anchored to matters, without thinking that they must
obey laws organized according to criteria following aprioristic schemes;
ii) the certainty to use terms in the scientific field as simple ‘types’ for filing
systems, adequate to «imaginary substrata of groups of natural phænomena»33,
but without constructing an ontology or a new metaphysics through them.
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30 Id., The Scientific Aspects of Positivism, in «The Fortnightly Review», 5 (1869), pp.
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ucation; and where to find it [1868], in CE, III, pp. 154-155).
33 Ivi, p. 161.
One more element: in the epistemological field, another difference that dis-
tinguishes Huxley from Comte is relative to the systematic classification of the
sciences.
Despite Huxley’s refusal to consider Comtean philosophy as being scientific,
because of the «unscientific spirit» of his work and of «no adequate acquaintance
with the physical sciences even of his time»34, I think that an additional reason
was due to the different conception of science used for social purposes.
Unlike Comte, Huxley does not believe that Science has a pyramid-shaped
structure depending on the relevance that each particular science has for the
building of knowledge. To him, all of them are important for humankind. Since
he states that science crosses the boundaries of observation by understanding na-
ture only through empirical and causative criteria, for him this represents a con-
tradiction when one states that only some particular kinds of science can plausi-
bly help human welfare35. In addition to these criticisms, Huxley tries to join the
concept of evolution to that of education. According to his definition contained
in his speech The University of Nature36, humankind grows according to the per-
fect harmony of natural laws.
The knowledge of those laws and the building of a theory of scientific
knowledge have the advantage of recognizing the impassable boundaries of phe-
nomenal knowledge, without making facts sacred.
With respect to this, the lesson of Descartes was capital. The use of ‘doubt’
as methodological structure opened doors to Kantian philosophy and to Hux-
leyan agnosticism.
Thanks to Cartesian materialism, Huxley is able to contrast Comtean mate-
rialism.
Unlike in the thought of the French positivist, Physics and Physiology in
Huxley’s conception are the symmetric pillars of two connected sciences, and it
is possible to establish analogies between these two sciences and their related
disciplines in order to bridge the gap that the science of the 16th and the 17th
centuries believed to be irremediable. If the principle on which matter or, gener-
ally speaking, reality is founded is unique, then equally, the epistemological
boundary of science in all its branches can only be one. From this point of view,
in my opinion, the doctrine of Huxley’s epiphenomenalism and the idea concern-
ing the evolution of mind represent the clearest effect of the influence of
Descartes over him.
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ABSTRACT
A Descartes, Thomas H. Huxley (1825-1895) riserva un posto particolare nelle sue
opere. Le sue concezioni fisiche e metafisiche costituirebbero la prova che il Francese sa-
rebbe il precursore sia dell’idealismo sia del materialismo del suo tempo e perciò Huxley
rinviene nei suoi lavori sulla fisica importanti suggerimenti tanto per la filosofia quanto
per la scienza ottocentesche. Le strade più significative che Descartes avrebbe percorso
riguardano «la fondazione di una cosmogonia razionale e di una psicologia fisiologica».
Il fatto che il mondo (fisico e organico) è subordinato alle medesime leggi della scienza
proverebbe che Descartes si trovasse nel giusto. Per questo motivo riteniamo che Huxley
attraverso la sua operazione intellettuale miri sostanzialmente a combattere il Positivismo
difendendo il valore della New Philosophy. Sosteniamo la tesi che Huxley consideri ne-
cessaria una ripresa del razionalismo cartesiano all’interno della filosofia del XIX secolo:
i) per rafforzare le asserzioni della scienza in ambito metodologico; ii) per sostenere la
tesi che le leggi di natura sono solo astrazioni matematiche e non descrizioni noumeni-
che della realtà naturale. Riguardo al primo punto, Huxley si avvale della fisica cartesia-
na come se si trattasse della porzione di un nuovo meccanicismo fisiologico; la seconda
tesi ci porterebbe a considerare le leggi di natura di Descartes come un tentativo di inte-
grare le istanze di Descartes e di Hume.
Descartes has a special place in the works of Thomas H. Huxley (1825-1895).
Descartes’ physics and metaphysics makes him think that the French Philosopher was
the ancestor as much of the idealism as of the materialism of his time. Huxley shows that
Descartes’s works on physics are full of important suggestions for the philosophy and
science of the 19th century. The most important paths Descartes pointed out were in his
view the «foundations of rational cosmogony and of physiological psychology». The fact
that the (physical and organic) world is subordinate to identical scientific laws proves
that Descartes was right. I argue that Huxley’s intellectual operation strives to undermine
Comtean positivism and to preserve the New Philosophy. I suppose that Huxley consid-
ers the presence of Cartesian rationalism in the 19th century as necessary: i) to strength-
en the methodological assertions of science; ii) to support the argument that the laws of
nature are only mathematical abstractions and not ‘noumenal’ descriptions of nature. On
the first issue, Huxley introduces Cartesian physics as a portion of the new mechanism
in physiology; the second hypothesis leads us to consider the Cartesian laws of nature as
an attempt to integrate both Descartes’ and Hume’s points of view.
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